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Abstract
We consider a voting situation where a society has to decide on the rule to use when choosing
among two alternatives in the uncertain future. Our analysis is related to the set up of Barbera
and Jackson (2001). While they consider …nite societies in our set up the economy has an
in…nite amount of agents. We de…ne a binary dominance relation over the set of decision rules
and determine the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable set of voting rules. It turns out that
the stable set always exists and is unique in the in…nite economy’s case. The stable set is however
not a singleton. Additionally the stable set coincides with the set of self-stable voting rules that
is the solution concept used by Barbera and Jackson (2001).
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1 Introduction
Barbera and Jackson (BJ henceforth) (2001) raise the question on how a society decides which
rules it uses to decide on issues. What makes this problem intriguing is that, as a rule, decisions
are based on some rules, and this immediately raises the question on how these rules are chosen
and an in…nite regress ensues. A satisfactory answer to the problem seems to require some kind of
…xed point property of the rule: A good rule should select itself.
Without any other structure the problem seems hard to get in touch with, and BJ consider a
speci…c situation where the society consist of a …nite number of agents who must make a choice
between two alternatives a and b. The former is a status quo alternative, and the latter is a
challenger that may replace the status quo. The potential rules are just numbers s 2 f1; :::;ng
where n is the number of agents in the society. A rule s means that in a voting b against a
the former replaces the latter if it gets at least s votes. The dichotomous choice environment is
convenient as it precludes strategic voting.
The agents in the society have preferences that are captured by a number pi 2 [0;1] which is
the probability that the agent favours the change of status quo (b over a). One can then determine
the induced preferences over the set of decision rules which are used in to choose between a and b.
The agents have to come to an agreement on the rule before they know whether they favour the
status quo or the change.
Now it is possible to put any rule in the position of a status quo and consider which rule would
be chosen if the status quo rule were used in deciding this. BJ de…ne the notion of self-stability
which captures the idea that a rule can maintain itself if it is the status quo and it is put against
all the other rules in a dichotomous choice situation. There may be a multitude of self-stable rules
or such can also fail to exist.
BJ consider …nite societies, and the calculations determining the preferences over rules and self-
stability are involved. In this article we rid ourselves of the problems of …niteness by considering
a society with …nitely many types where each type is of some measure. We show that the non-
existence of self-stable rules ceases but there is always a multiplicity of them.
We think that instead of de…ning a single-valued solution concept that has some kind of inherent
stability property it is useful to take one step backwards and de…ne a dominance relation between
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the rules. Using this we determine the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set which we propose as
a solution concept. It turns out that there is always a unique stable set. In a sense we do not get
rid of the multiplicity problem as the stable set is not a singleton but it shows in an interesting
way how the rules relate to each other. The dominance relation we use says roughly the following:
A rule s dominates another rule s0 if using rule s0 rule s would be chosen.
Moving from a …nite society to a continuum society we lose some interesting features that BJ
have in their article. For instance, in the …nite society it is the relative values, not the absolute
values of pi 2 [0;1], that determine the agents preferences over rules. With very many agents the
number of agents that support change is almost certain, and the agents’ preferences become such
that all the rules above the expected number of supporters are equally good, and all the rules below
this number are equally good. On the upside we gain in the sense that we get much more clear cut
results than in the …nite society.
In section 2 we present the basics of the model, and in section 3 we determine the stable set
and the self-stable voting rules. In section 4 we compare the stable rules given by the notions of
the stable set and self-stability. In section 5 we present the conclusions.
2 The Model
In the society there exists a state of a¤airs a which is called the status quo. Then there also exists
an alternative state of a¤airs b which may be chosen to be the new status quo. The decision between
a and b is be made by a vote in some future date. There exists a continuum of voters in the society,
and each voter’s preference is represented by a number pi 2 [0;1]. This tells the probability that
she will vote for the alternative b when the election date comes up. There is a …nite number of
types of voters numbered so that p1 < p2 < ::: < pn. The measure of type i voters is ®i and the
measure of all agents is unity,
nP
i=1
®i = 1: With this speci…cation there are exactly
B =
nX
i=1
®ipi (1)
agents who vote for b when it is staged against the status quo a. Note that in the in…nite society
the relative probabilities do not matter any more; the only important thing is whether a voter will
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vote for b with a probability that is less or more than one half. This means that we are roughly1
back in the simple case that BJ call a dichotomous society, and where they show that self-stable
voting rules always exist.2
De…nition 1 A voting rule s is a number s 2 (0; 1].
If at least measure s of voters vote for the alternative b then b is selected. Otherwise the status
quo a remains. Utility for voter i from status quo a is given by
Ui (aji favors a) = 1 (2)
Ui (aji favors b) = 0: (3)
The utility for voter i from b is given by
Ui (bji favors b) = 1 (4)
Ui (bji favors a) = 0: (5)
Next we determine the voters’ utilities when some voting rule s is used. The status quo a is
maintained if s > B. The alternative b is chosen as a result of the vote when a rule s · B is used.
Consider a voting rule that requires at least a measure s of supporters. The utility for a voter i
from this voting rule is de…ned by
ui (s) = piUi (aji favors b) + (1 ¡ pi)Ui (aji favors a) , when s > B (6)
ui (s) = piUi (bji favors b) + (1 ¡ pi)Ui (bji favors a) , when s · B. (7)
Then we have that if k is the largest probability such that pk · 12 the voters with i · k want a rule
s > B and voters i = k +1 with probabilities pk+1 > 12 want a rule s · B.
1See conclusion for further details.
2It is also unnecessary to have a …nite number of types.
4
 ( )Bssui >|   
 
( )Bssui £|  
1
  
Utility  
Probability of favoring  
change               
1
  
½ 
 
Utility functions
3 Stable set and self-stability
We consider two di¤erent notions of stable voting rules. First we introduce a dominance relation
between di¤erent voting rules and consider whether there exists a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set. We …nd that the stable set exists and it is unique. Second in the continuum case self-stable
voting rules exist, like in the case of a dichotomous society in BJ, but there is not hope of uniqueness.
De…nition 2 We denote the measure of all types i that satisfy some property ¼ as
¹fij¼g = P
i2f1;:::;ng:property ¼ is true
®i:
Let’s now de…ne a dominance relation.
De…nition 3 A voting rule s dominates voting rule s0 if ¹fijUi (s) > Ui (s0)g ¸ s0. We denote this
dominance relation as s¢s0:
Thus if the decision makers have to decide between the rules s and s0 then the rule s0 is
dominated by the rule s if it receives more than a measure s0 of votes. That is, when s0 is the rule
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used to make decisions, then there exists at least one rule s such that s gets selected over s0. This,
of course, would suggest that such a rule is very poor since it can’t sustain itself. Next we give the
de…nition of a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set:
De…nition 4 A set S is internally stable if 8s;s0 2 S, : (s0¢s) and : (s¢s0) holds.
De…nition 5 A set S is externally stable if 8s =2 S 9s0 2 S : s0¢s.
De…nition 6 A set SS is the stable set if it is both internally and externally stable.
Thus the internal stability requires that the rules in the stable set do not dominate each other
and the external stability says that all rules that do not belong to the stable set are dominated by
some rule in the stable set. Additionally we give the de…nition of self-stable voting rule:
De…nition 7 (Barbera and Jackson (2001))
A voting rule s is self-stable if for all s0 6= s
¹
©
ijUi ¡s0¢ > Ui (s)ª < s. (8)
From above it is clear that here rule s has a status quo position. That is, rule s is used when
deciding about rules. A self-stable voting rule s must sustain itself when any rule s0 is brought up
against the self-stable voting rule.
If for all types i · k the probability of preferring the change is pi · 12 and for all types i > k+1
the probability is pi > 12, then the measure of types that prefer rules that are larger than B is
s =
kP
i=1
®i. Hence all "small" rules with s · B get 1 ¡ s votes against rules s0 > B and all "large"
rules s > B get s votes against rules s0 · B. We can now calculate the measures of proponents for
di¤erent rules:
A rule s · B dominates s0 > B if
¹
©
ijUi (s) > Ui ¡s0¢ª ¸ s0 , 1 ¡ s ¸ s0. (9)
Similarly a rule s > B dominates s0 · B if
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¹
©
ijUi (s) > Ui ¡s0¢ª ¸ s0 , s ¸ s0. (10)
Additionally if s,s0 · B, or s,s0 > B then
¹
©
ijUi (s) > Ui¡s0¢ª = 0. (11)
We now show that with the dominance relation ¢ a stable set exists. The …rst proposition
proves the two cases where all voters prefer either the status quo or the alternative. In the second
proposition the proof is organized in six parts. First we …nd a set of rules that are not dominated
by any rules. It should be noted that none of these rules may be left outside of the stable set since
otherwise the external stability would be violated. Then we show that no matter which rule we
pick outside this set we always …nd a rule from this set that dominates the rule outside. Then, as
a consequence of this construction, the stable set is also unique. Note also that we do not have to
check whether rules that are "on the same side" of B dominate each other since by (11) they are
equivalent from the voters’ point of view.
Proposition 1 With the dominance relation ¢ a stable set exists if either pi > 12 or pi · 12 for all
i 2 f1; :::;ng.
Proof. Let pi · 12 for all i 2 f1; :::; ng, B is de…ned as above and s =
nP
i=1
®i = 1: Then (9)
cannot hold for any s0 > B. Now any set (0; ~s] ½ (0;B] can not be a stable set since there does not
exist a rule s < B such that s¢s0 would hold for any s0 > B. In this case all voters prefer large
rules and the stable set is (B;1].
Similarly it can be shown that the stable set exists and is unique when pi > 12 for all i 2 f1; :::; ng.
In this case the stable set is (0;B].
Proposition 2 If for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, pi · 12 and for i 2 fk + 1; :::;ng, pi > 12, then a stable set
exists.
Proof. i.) Suppose that 1 ¡ s · s < B then the stable set is SS = (s;1]
We …rst note that all the rules s0 in the set [0; s] are dominated by the rules s in (B;1] since
by (10) it holds that s ¸ s0. Now let s 2 (s;B] and s0 2 (B;1] then by (9) s¢s0 would imply that
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1 ¡s ¸ s0 > B which is a contradiction. Similarly s0¢s would imply by (10) that s ¸ s0 > B which
is also a contradiction. Then all the rules that are not dominated are in the set (s;1]. If the set
that contains all the rules that are not dominated contains a rule s that belongs to the stable set
then this implies that the whole set belongs to the stable set. Let’s pick a rule s from the set (B; 1].
Since these rules dominate all rules in the set [0; s] then s and also (s; 1] belong to the stable set.
As the rules in [0; s] are dominated we have that the stable set is (s; 1].
ii.) Suppose now that s · 1 ¡ s < B then the stable set is SS = (s;1]. The proof is analogous
to the case i.
iii.) Suppose that s < B · 1 ¡ s then the stable set is SS = (s; B] [ (1 ¡ s; 1].
Let s0 2 (0; s] and s 2 (1 ¡ s; 1]. Then s0¢s would imply by (9) that 1 ¡ s ¸ s which is a
contradiction. Similarly s¢s0 implies by (10) that s ¸ s0 which holds.
Let now s0 2 (B;1 ¡ s] and s 2 (s; B]. Then s0¢s would imply by (10) that s ¸ s which is a
contradiction. Similarly s¢s0 implies by (9) that 1 ¡ s ¸ s0 which holds.
Additionally we note that when s0 2 (0; s] and s 2 (B;1 ¡ s] we have that s0¢s holds since (9)
gives us 1 ¡s ¸ s and also s¢s0 holds since by (10) s ¸ s0. Hence the rules in (0; s] [ (B;1 ¡ s] are
dominated.
Now let s 2 (s;B] and s0 2 (1 ¡ s; 1]. Then s0¢s would require by (10) that s ¸ s which clearly
does not hold. Similarly s¢s0 requires by (9) that 1 ¡ s ¸ s0 which does not hold either. Thus all
the rules that are not dominated are in the set (s; B] [ (1 ¡ s; 1]. Since we showed above that the
rules in (s;B] dominate the rules in (B; 1 ¡ s] and that the rules in (1 ¡ s;1] dominate the rules in
(0; s] we have established that the stable set is (s;B] [ (1 ¡ s;1].
iv.) Suppose that 1 ¡ s · B · s then the stable set is (B; 1].
Let’s pick any rule s 2 (B;1] then by (10) we have that s¢s0 since s ¸ s is true for all s0 2 [0;B].
Similarly (9) gives us that s0¢s can not hold since 1 ¡ s < s is true for all s 2 (B;1]. Then the
rules that are not dominated are in the set (B; 1]. These rules dominate the rules in [0;B] and thus
the stable set is (B;1].
v.) Suppose that B < 1 ¡ s · s then the stable set is (1 ¡ s; 1].
Let s 2 (1 ¡ s;1] and s0 2 [0;B] then by (10) we have that s¢s0 since s ¸ s0 is true for all
s0 2 [0; B]. Similarly s0¢s would imply by (9) that 1 ¡ s ¸ s 2 (1 ¡ s;1] which is a contradiction.
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Note that for rules s 2 (B;1 ¡ s] and rules s0 2 [0;B] both s0¢s and s¢s0 hold since by (9) 1¡s ¸ s
and by (10) s ¸ s0. Then the rules that are not dominated are in the set (1 ¡ s; 1]. These rules
dominate the rules in [0;1 ¡ s] and thus the stable set is (1 ¡ s; 1].
vi.) Suppose that B · s < 1 ¡ s. Then the stable set is (1 ¡ s;1]. The proof is analogous to
the case v.
Combining propositions 1 and 2 the stable set always exists and is unique.
Next we show that the self-stable voting rules always exists and that the set of self-stable rules
coincides with the rules in the stable set.
Proposition 3 A self-stable voting rules always exists and the set of self-stable rules coincides with
the stable set.
Proof. A rule s is self-stable if for all s0 6= s inequality (8) holds. Then rule s is not self-stable
if there exists a rule s0 such that ¹fijUi (s0) > Ui (s)g ¸ s , 9s0 6= s : s0¢s. Then the requirement
of self-stability is equivalent to the requirement that no rules dominate s. Thus to …nd the set of
self-stable rules one needs to look for the rules that are not dominated. Since in Propositions 1 and
2 we showed that all the rules in the stable-set are not dominated it follows immediately that the
set of self-stable rules coincide with the stable set.
4 Comparison of stable set and the set of self-stable voting rules
and interpretations
There are no di¤erences between the rules in the stable set and the set of self-stable voting rules.
In all cases above the set of self-stable rules and the stable set coincide. Thus we conclude that
the dominance relation with the von Neumann-Morgestern stable set is equivalent to the notion of
self-stable voting rules in this set up with a continuum of agents.
There are two forces that a¤ect the stable set. First, the voting rules have di¤erent inherent
properties with respect to our dominance relation ¢. "Very small" rules are easy to get rid of
since when they are in a status quo position only a small number of votes are required to replace
them. In contrast, "very large" rules in status quo position require a large number of votes to be
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replaced. It is because of these properties that in all cases above the stable set contains no "very
small" rules and on the other hand it always contains the "very large" rules. Secondly, the number
of proponents of large and small rules, of course, a¤ects which rules are easily replaced and which
are not.
In the case where 1 ¡ s · s < B we have that the proponents of the large rules are a larger
group than the proponents of the small rules. However the proponents of the large rules are too
few to exclude the small rules (s; B] from the stable set that is (s;1]. The proponents of the small
rules are, however, too small a group to rule out any large rules. That’s why the stable set contains
all large rules and the set (s;B] of small rules. The fact that the stable set contains both small
and large rules re‡ects the weakness of the voters that prefer large rules. If there were more than
B voters that prefer the large voting rules then the stable set would not contain any small rules.
This is essentially the case iv. The interpretations are similar in the case where the roles of 1 ¡ s
and s are reversed.
In the case where s < B · 1 ¡ s the proponents of the small rules are a larger group than the
proponents of the large rules. Now the proponents of the small rules fail to exclude the large rules
(1 ¡ s;1] from the stable set. In order to exclude all large rules from the stable set all voters would
have to be in favor of the small rules as is shown in proposition 1. Similarly the proponents of the
large rules are too small a group to exclude the small rules (s; B] from the stable set. Since the
inherent properties of the voting rules make it easy to rule out the "very small" rules and di¢cult
to exclude the "very large" rules the stable set is (s;B] [ (1 ¡ s; 1]. Note that the proponents of
change are a larger group ex ante than they will be ex post B · 1 ¡ s. This also gives rationale
for the fact that also large rules belong to the stable set. Some proponents of the small rules will
eventually vote for the status quo.
Finally in the case where both 1 ¡ s and s are larger than B the stable set contains only large
rules that is SS = (1 ¡ s; 1]. This is because the proponents of the large rules are numerous enough
to exclude all small rules from the stable set. Since the proponents of the small rules are also quite
large the proponents of the large rules cannot include rules B < s · 1 ¡ s to the stable set. Even
if the proponents of the small rules were a larger group than the proponents of the large rules
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(case vi. above), only large rules, that preserve the status quo, belong to the stable set. This is
because some voters that prefer small rules are bound to …nd themselves voting for the status quo.
The reason is same as above: the proponents of change are a larger group ex ante than they will
eventually be ex post.
5 Conclusion
A move from the …nite agent environment of BJ to an environment with a continuum of agents and
a …nite number of types allows us to understand some aspects of the notion of self-stability better.
In particular, when the number of agents increases the importance of the relative probabilities
decreases, and the agents’ preferences depend just on whether their ex-ante probability of favouring
the change is more or less than one half.
Another point of view to the problem of which rules one can expect to be chosen is got by con-
sidering a dominance relation between the rules, and determining the von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set. This turns out to exist in all cases, and it is also unique. In addition using the dom-
inance relation that we gave in the beginning one gets exactly the same set of decision rules as
one would get when using the notion of self-stability. The set up of a continuum society is not
exactly equivalent to dichotomous society since the set of self-stable rules and stable set coincide
in one setting but fail to do so in another3. However the way to characterize the set of self-stable
rules with our dominance relation works also in the …nite case. In our opinion the dominance
relation is more fundamental than the notion of self-stability and we see this close relationship as
justifying the self-stability notion given that one perceives our dominance relation as a reasonable
one. The dominance relation could well be de…ned in some other way. Another natural candidate
for the dominance relation that we considered is not as good as ¢, as there may be a multiplic-
ity of stable sets. This relation is de…ned as follows: A voting rule s dominates voting rule s0 if
¹fijUi (s) > Ui (s0)g ¸ s. The interpretation is that a rule s dominates another rule s0 if s happens
to be the status quo, and s selects itself. Note that this does not eliminate the possibility that s
would also select rule s0.
3The exact calculations concerning the characterization of the stable set and the set of self-stable rules are available
from the authors.
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Consider a situation where for all i 2 f1; :::; kg, pi · 12 and for i 2 fk +1; :::; ng, pi ¸ 12. Now
(0;B] is a stable set if
nP
i=k+1
®i ¸ B. Set (B;1] is a stable set if
kP
i=1
®i > B. As B =
nP
i=1
pi®i these
two conditions can be satis…ed simultaneously. An example is a society with only two types where
p1 = 0:3 and p2 = 0:6; ®2 = 1 ¡®1 and 47 ¸ ®1 > 613.
Finally we note that all the analysis here is based on the voting situation where one alternative,
be it a real one or a rule, is a status quo and it is staged against a challenger. This is quite speci…c,
and in a way bypasses a lot that is interesting when one tries to …gure out what kind of rules emerge
in a situation where no rule is given any special status. The problem is that most other formulations
seem to lead to a game situation where it is not easy determine the induced preferences over the
rules, while in the setting of this article, the agents always vote truthfully.
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